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1. MOTIVATION
The development of computable (equivalently, recursive) function theory made it
possible to investigate the computational aspects of many mathematical notions
and constructions within the context of classical mathematics. In the 1930s Kleene
and Church investigated computability on the integers and in wellordered sets and
invented the notion of recursive ordinal. In the 1950s Fro elich and Shepherdson
[9] investigated computability in fields. In the 1960s Rabin [18] and Malcev[12]
initiated the study of computable algebra and computable model theory. In the
1970s, Ershov’s school in Russia and Nerode’s school in the United States began
the systematic use of the priority methods from computability theory to determine
under what conditions classical constructions in model theory or algebra can be
made computable. Since then, theories of computable algebraic systems and
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computable models have been the subject of concentrated attention by many logicians.
Computability has been investigated in such areas as vector spaces, orderings,
Boolean algebras, Abelian groups, fields, rings, and lattices. We refer the reader to
Downey [8], Nerode-Remmel [15], Hazarinov [10], and Millar [13] for surveys.
Nowadays there are many papers in many other areas of mathematics which deal,
in one sense or another, with computability in mathematical structures. For example,
there are theories of computability in topological spaces, metric spaces, and Banach
spaces. These latter all establish the relations between notions of computability on the
one hand and continuity on the other.
In this paper we investigate effectiveness of Kripke models for first-order theories
of intermediate logics, i.e., ones that lie between intuitionistic and classical predicate
logic. How does one find an appropriate notion of effectiveness for these models
and theories? We proceed by looking in detail at how one went from model theory
of classical first-order logic to model theory of intuitionistic logic. The completeness
of classical predicate first order logic can be expressed by the assertion that if a
theory 1 is consistent, then 1 has a classical model. Things are more complicated
for the model theory of intuitionistic logic. There are several model theories for
intuitionistic logic with quite different flavors. One is lambda calculus models,
leading to the work of Girard and of Martin-Lo f on typed lambda calculi, or, as
Scott has observed, equivalently leading to closed cartesian categories (untyped
lambda calculi). In such models existential quantifiers are interpreted as functionals
(lambda terms). A second style of model is Kripke andor Beth models. A third is
the topological models as introduced by Rasiowa and Sikorski from prior work of
Tarski, for their early 1950s proof of completeness of intuitionistic predicate logic
within classical mathematics. All these classes of models are adequate to give classical
proofs of completeness of intuitionistic predicate logic, although the literature is
especially opaque when one looks for the equivalences and proofs of completeness
(see the work of La uchli and also of Scott). There is also a body of work on construc-
tive proofs of completeness of predicate intuitionistic logic. These are based on a very
careful choice of definition of model and a very careful formulation of the statement of
completeness. These proofs use so-called feeble (in plain English, contradictory)
models, see Troelstra and Van Dalen, Vol. 2 of [21]. In this paper we look only at
Kripke models of intuitionistic predicate logic, leaving the others for other papers.
Thus, a formulation of completeness (by Kripke) of intuitionistic predicate logic
can be expressed by the assertion that if 1 is consistent in intuitionistic predicate
logic, then 1 has a (single) Kripke model M such that the sentences forced in M
are exactly those intuitionistically provable from 1. We call such models adequate
models of 1. The standard proof of this theorem can be thought of as generalizing
to intuitionistic logic and its Kripke models the Henkin 1949 proof for classical
predicate logic, see [7] or [19]. In that generalization the maximal filters of the
Lindenbaum Boolean algebra of 1 are replaced by prime filters of the Lindenbaum
Heyting algebra of 1. Thus, a reasonable attempt to introduce effectiveness into
model theory of intuitionistic logic is to begin by trying to understand the effective
content of the completeness (by Kripke) theorem for intuitionistic predicate logic
and more generally for intermediate logics. This leads us to investigate computable
intuitionistic theories and computable adequate Kripke models.
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Here we mention some previous results concerning computability of Kripke models
and intuitionistic theories. Gabbay in [4] proved that for any decidable finitely
axiomatized intuitionistic theory 1 and any sentence , not intuitionistically derivable
from 1, there is a Kripke model (not necessarily adequate) of 1 which does not
force ,, such that the underlying partially ordered set is a computable enumerable
partial ordering, and such that forcing restricted to atomic statements is computably
enumerable. In [11] a more sophisticated argument proves that any decidable
intuitionistic theory 1 has an adequate Kripke model M with decidable forcing
such that for all sentences ,, , is an intuitionistic consequence of 1 if and only if
M forces ,. This generalizes the theorem in classical computable model theory that
a decidable theory has a decidable model. This generalizes Gabbay’s assumption
that 1 is finitely axiomatized, while his conclusion that forcing for atomic formulas
is decidable is strengthened to the decidability of forcing in general, not merely
atomic forcing, in the Kripke model constructed. However, the proof in [11]
guarantees only that the underlying partial ordering is a 6 02-set, while here in
Section 5 we show that the underlying partial ordering can in fact be made computable.
This paper deals with the effective content of semantic completeness, with respect
to Kripke models, of intuitionistic logic and some of its extensions such as classical
logic CPL, constant domain logic CD, directed frames logic QJ, logic of frames
with maximum elements KJ, logic of frames with maximum elements and constant
domains KJC, and Dummett’s logic DL. Our results for intermediate logics are
new, whereas the result for intuitionistic logic refines [11] as mentioned above. The
present paper is selfcontained1 and covers basic notions and terminology from
intuitionistic model theory and computability theory. In the next section we briefly
explain the material on Kripke models, forcing, computability, intermediate logics,
and completeness of intermediate logics for Kripke models.
2. BASIC NOTIONS
In this section we summarize Kripke models, forcing, intuitionistic logic, some
basic definitions from computability theory, intermediate logics, and Kripke
completeness.
Kripke Frames and Models. Let L=(Pn00 , ..., P
nk
k ..., c0 , c1 , ...) be a countable
first-order language without function symbols. We suppose that the language L is
computable, and that the set of constants C=[c0 , c1 , ...] of the language and the
function k  nk are also computable. We denote the set of all sentences of L by Sn(L).
A frame is a triple F=(W, , D) consisting of a nonempty set W, (‘‘states of
knowledge’’ or ‘‘forcing conditions’’), a partial order  on W, and a map D from W to
a power set such that vw implies D(v)D(w). D is called the domain function. The
partially ordered set (W, ) is called the base of the frame.
We suppose that we are given a mapping V, called a valuation, which assigns to
each pair consisting of a w # W and an n-ary predicate symbol P (constant c) from L,
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a n-ary relation on D(w) (element of D(w)). Thus one can think that V(w) is a classical
L-structure which is associated with w.
Let L(w) be the extension of the language L obtained by adding to L a constant
(name) ca for each element a # D(w). Let A(w) be the set of all atomic sentences of
language L(w) classically true in D(w) under the valuation V. Suppose that for all
vw the set of all atomic sentences from A(v) is a subset of A(w). Then the 4-tuple
M=(W, , D, V ) is called a Kripke model (over frame F ) . Here is the definition
of forcing in a Kripke model.
Definition 2.1. Let (W, , D, V ) be a Kripke model of language L, w be in W
and , be a sentence from L(w). We give the definition of ‘‘w forces ,’’ by induction
on the complexity of ,.
1. For atomic sentences ,, w forces , iff , # A(w).
2. w forces ,   iff for all vw, v forces , implies v forces .
3. w forces c,, iff for all vw, v does not force ,.
4. w forces \x, iff for all vw and all constants c # L(v), v forces ,(c).
5. w forces _x, iff for some c # L(w), w forces ,(c).
6. w forces , 6  iff w forces , or w forces .
7. w forces , 7  iff w forces , and w forces .
We say that M forces a sentence , of language L if every w # W forces ,. By
induction on the length of sentences , # L(w), one can prove that if w forces , and
vw, then v forces ,. If (W, , D, V ) is a Kripke model whose base is antichain,
then all sentences forced in (W, , D, V ) coincide with the class of all sentences
classically true in all structures V(w), w # W.
Let 1 be a subset of Sn(L). The closure of 1 is the set of all sentences which are
intuitionistically deducible from 1. A set 1 of sentences is consistent if the closure
of 1 does not contain falsehood =. Following the lines of Henkin’s proof for classical
logic, one can prove the classical (Kripke) completeness result of intuitionistic logic.
Theorem 2.1. For any consistent set 1 of sentences of language L, there exists a
Kripke model M such that for all ,, M forces , if and only if , is deducible from 1.
Full proofs of this theorem can be found in [7] or [19]. The proof proceeds by
constructing ‘‘prime theories’’ containing 1. These are consistent sets extending 1 in
a language obtained by adding to the original language L infinitely many new
constant symbols which are prime filters with the witness property in the Lindenbaum
Heyting algebra defined by intuitionistic deducibility from 1. The base of the Kripke
model is the set of all these prime theories, the partial ordering is set-theoretic inclusion
between two such prime theories. This theorem leads us to an important definition.
Definition 2.2. A Kripke model M is adequate for 1 if for all ,, M forces , if
and only if , is deducible from 1.
Computability Theory. A function is computable if there is a Turing machine
which computes it. We denote the set of all natural numbers by | or N. A subset
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of the natural numbers is computable if its characteristic function is computable.
A set of natural numbers is computably enumerable (c.e.) if it is the range of a
computable function. We fix a standard effective enumeration 8X0 , 8
X
1 , ... of all
computable partial functions with oracle X. We call number n an index of 8Xn .
A set A is called 701 if there is a computable relation R such that x # A iff _yR(x, y)
holds. R is called 6 01 if |&A is 7
0
1 . Finally we call A 7
0
n+1 iff there is a 6
0
n relation




n (n # |)
sets form a proper hierarchy called the arithmetical hierarchy. We assume that the
reader knows basic facts about the jump operator and Turing degrees. Briefly, for a set
A, the set A$=[(i, j) | ,i ( j)A is defined] is called the jump of A. Iterating the jump
operation n times we get n th jump of A denoted by An. 0n is the nth jump of computable
degree denoted by 0. 0| is the degree of the set [(x, i) | x # 0i]. The degree 01 is usually
denoted by 0$. We refer to Soare [20] for the basic computability theory.
Intermediate Logics and Completeness. If we add the schema : 6c: to intui-
tionistic predicate logic IPL, then we obtain full classical predicate logic CPL. It is
natural to ask what logics arise by adding schema to IPL other than the law of the
excluded middle. Here are some well-known intermediate logics. Constant domain
logic, denoted by CDL, is obtained by adding the schema
\x(:(x) 6 ;)  \x:(x) 6 ;,
where x is not free in ;, to IPL. The logic denoted by QJ is obtained by adding
the schema
c: 6 cc:
to IPL. The logic KJ is obtained by adding the schema
\xcc:  cc\x:
to QJ. All of the five logics S above are closed under substitution. That is, if ,
is intuitionistically deducible from S and ,$ is obtained from , by replacing any
atomic subformula in , by some formula, then ,$ is also in S. Here is a formal
definition of the notion of an intermediate logic.
Definition 2.3. A set S of formulas provable in CPL is called an intermediate
logic, or briefly a logic, if S is closed under intuitionistic deduction and substitution.
From the definition it follows that IPL, CPL, CD, QJ, and KJ are examples of
intermediate logics. A natural semantical way to obtain intermediate logics is the
following. Fix a class K of Kripke frames. Consider the set S(K ) of all sentences
which are forced by all Kripke models over frames from K. Then S(K ) is an inter-
mediate logic. Thus, one can consider logics of the type S(K ) for some natural
classes of frames. We introduce several such classes. Let F=(W, , D) be a frame.
F is antichain if for all u, v # W, the condition uv implies u=v. F is a tree frame
if its base is a tree. F is constant domain frame if for all u, v # W, D(u)=D(v). F is
linear frame if vw or wv for all v, w # W. F is directed if for all v, w # W there
z # W such that vz and wz. The frame (W, , D) is a frame with maximum
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element if there exists a w # W such that for all v # W, vw. These are all suggested
naturally by algebra. Thus, we have logics of antichain frames, tree frames, constant
domain frames, linear frames, etc.
Now we give one of the basic definitions in intuitionistic model theory.
Definition 2.4. A logic S is complete for a class K of Kripke frames if the
following two conditions hold:
1. All Kripke models over frames from K force all formulas from S.
2. For any : # Sn(L) if : is not provable in S, then there is a Kripke model
M over a Kripke frame in K such that M does not force :.
Thus, if S is complete for a class K, then S coincides with S(K ).
The following completeness results are known from intuitionistic model theory:
Classical predicate logic CPL is complete for the class of antichain frames; intui-
tionistic predicate logic IPL is complete for the class of tree frames; the logic CDL
is complete for the class of constant domain frames; the logic QJ is complete for
the class of directed frames; the logic KJ is complete for the class of frames with
maximum elements; Dummett’s logic is complete for the class of linearly ordered
frames, etc. For proofs of these results and surveys of the subject, see [3, 57, 19].
In Sections 3 and 4 we define needed notions. We show that every computable
theory can be extended to a so-called complete computable theory. We introduce
saturated theories and show that every consistent computable theory can be extended
to a computable saturated theory. In Section 5 we define decidable Kripke models.
Briefly, a Kripke model is decidable if its base and forcing are computable relations. We
prove that every computable theory over IPL has an adequate decidable Kripke
model. In Section 6, we show that every decidable first-order theory over CPL has a
decidable Kripke model whose frame is antichain. In Section 7, we introduce Henkin
complete theories and prove that every computable theory over CDL has a decidable
Kripke model over a constant domain frame. In the next two sections we investigate
the computability of adequate models in logics QJ and KJ. We show, for example, that
every computable theory in QJ has an adequate Kripke model decidable in 0| over a
directed frame. The last section contains conclusions and acknowledgements. The
proofs are based on recasting classical completeness proofs for intermediate logics to
expose their effective content. This often requires substantial changes.
3. THEORIES AND THEIR EXTENSIONS
We fix a language L and a logic S. When a sentence , is intuitionistically deducible
in logic S, we simply say that , is deducible or S-deducible and write |&S ,. The
following definition is the basic one for this paper, and stems from Stone’s ideal and
filter theory of distributive lattices and also from the theory of interpolants.
Definition 3.1. 1. A theory T is a pair (1, 7), where 1 and 7 are sets of
sentences. We set lT=1 and rT=7.
2. A Kripke model M is adequate for T if for all sentences ,, , is deducible
from lT if and only if M forces ,.
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We say that a theory T=(1, 7) is inconsistent if there exist :1 , ..., :n # 1 and
;1 , ..., ;m # 7 such that :1 7 } } } 7 :n  ;1 6 } } } 6 ;m is S-deducible. A theory
T=(1, 7) is consistent if it is not inconsistent.
Proposition 3.1. Let T=(1, 7) be a consistent theory. Then there exists a
theory T $=(1 $, 7$) such that
1. (1 $, 7$) is consistent,
2. 1 $ _ 7$=Sn(L),
3. 1/1 $ and 7/7$.
Proof. Let :0 , :1 , ... be a list of all sentences of the language L. We construct a
sequence (10 , 70), (11 , 71), ... of theories such that
1. for all i # |, 1i/1i+1 , 7i/7i+1 ,
2. for all i # |, (1i , 7i) is consistent,
3. i (1i _ 7i)=Sn(L).
We build this sequence by stages.
Stage 0. Put (10 , 70)=T=(1, 7).
Stage n+1. Suppose that Tn=(1n , 7n) has been constructed. Take :n . We
have two cases.
Case 1. The theory (1n , 7n _ [:n]) is consistent. Then simply put 1n+1=1n
and 7n+1=7n _ [:n].
Case 2. The theory (1n , 7n _ [:n]) is inconsistent. Then put 1n+1=1n _ [:n]
and 7n+1=7n .
This ends the construction.
Put 1 $=n 1n and 7$=n 7n . Since at each stage :n # 1n+1 _ 7n+1 , we see
that Sn(L)=1 $ _ 7$.
We need to prove that T=(1 $, 7$) is consistent. It suffices to show that for
every n, the theory (1n , 7n) is consistent. We show it by induction on n. Clearly
(10 , 70)=T=(1, 7) is consistent. Suppose that Tn=(1n , 7n) is consistent.
Consider stage n+1. If the theory (1n , 7n _ [:n]) is consistent, then obviously
Tn+1=(1n+1 , 7n+1) is consistent. Suppose that (1n , 7n _ [:n]) is inconsistent.
Consider Tn+1=(1n+1 , 7n+1) which is (1n _ [:n], 7n). Suppose that Tn+1=
(1n+1 , 7n+1) is inconsistent. Then there exist :$1 , ..., :$k # 1n+1 and ;1 , ..., ;m #
7n+1=7n such that
:$1 7 } } } 7 :$k  ;1 6 } } } 6 ;m
is deducible in S. By the induction hypothesis Tn=(1n , 7n) is consistent. Hence
:n # [:$1 , ..., :$k]. Since (1n , 7n _ [:n]) is inconsistent, there exist :"1 , ..., :"t # 1n and
;$1 , ..., ;$r # 7n+1=7n _ [:n] such that
:"1 7 } } } 7 :"t  ;$1 6 } } } 6 ;$r
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is deducible in S. Hence, it is not hard to see that Tn=(1n , 7n) is inconsistent.
This is a contradiction. It follows that T=(1 $, 7$) is a consistent theory. The
proposition is proved.
Definition 3.2. A theory T=(1, 7) is complete if it is consistent and Sn(L)=1 _ 7.
We also say that T=(1 $, 7$) extends T=(1, 7) if 1/1 $ and 7/7$. Thus, we
have the following
Corollary 3.1. Every consistent theory has a complete extension in the same
language.
Definition 3.3. A proper subset 1 of Sn(L) is prime if the following conditions
are satisfied:
1. 1 is closed under deduction in S.
2. For all :, ; # Sn(L) if : 6 ; # 1, then either : # 1 or ; # 1.
For any subset X/Sn(L) let X be the complement of X in Sn(L), that is
X =Sn(L)"X.
Proposition 3.2. A set 1/Sn(L) is prime if and only if the theory (1, 1 ) is
complete.
Proof. Suppose that 1 is prime. Clearly 1 _ 1 =Sn(L). We need to show that
(1, 1 ) is consistent. Suppose not. Then there exist :1 , ..., :k # 1 and ;1 , ..., ;m # 1
such that
:1 7 } } } 7 :k  ;1 6 } } } 6 ;m .
is provable in S. Hence, ;1 6 } } } 6 ;m # 1 since 1 is closed under deduction. Since
1 is prime a ;i belongs to 1 for some in. Contradiction.
Now suppose that (1, 1 ) is complete. If : is deducible from 1 in logic S, then
: # 1. Otherwise, (1, 1 ) would be inconsistent. Suppose that : 6 ; # 1 but neither
: nor ; belongs to 1. Hence :, ; # 1 and : 6 ;  : 6 ; # 1. Hence (1, 1 ) is incon-
sistent. Contradiction. The proposition is proved.
Definition 3.4. We say that a set 1 of sentences is 7-consistent if T=(1, 7) is
consistent. When 7=[;], then 7 -consistent set is called ;-consistent.
Thus, 1/Sn(L) is consistent if and only if 1 is =-consistent.
Definition 3.5. A theory T=(1, 7) is computable if the deductive closure of 1
in logic S and the set 7 are computable.
We can relativize the above definition by saying that T=(1, 7) is computable in
X if the deductive closure of 1 in logic S and the set 7 are computable in X. From
the proof of Proposition 3.1, we now have the following result.
Proposition 3.3. Suppose that T=(1, 7) is a computable consistent theory and
7 is finite. Then T has a complete computable extension.
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Proof. Let T=(1, 7) be a computable consistent theory with 7 finite. Let
2=[:1 , ..., :n] be a finite set of sentences. Then by the deduction theorem 1 _ 2
proves , if and only if 1 proves ni=1 :i  ,. It follows that the closure of 1 _ 2
is also computable. Therefore for finite subsets 21 , 22/Sn(L), the theory
(1 _ 21 , 7 _ 22) is computable. Since 7 is finite and the closure of 1 is computable,
the construction of the proof of Proposition 2.1 can be carried out effectively. We
need to show that the extension 1 $ obtained in the construction is a computable
set. Indeed take a sentence :. Then there is an n such that :=:n . Then : # 1 $ if
and only if :n # 1n+1 . Hence the theory T=(1 $, 7$) obtained by applying the
construction in Proposition 3.1 to the given theory T=(1, 7) is computable. The
proposition is proved.
Corollary 3.2. Any consistent theory T=(1, 7) computable in X with 7 finite
has a complete extension computable in X.
4. SATURATED THEORIES
In proving completeness theorems, constant expansions of the original language
L play an important role. Thus, let L be a language and C be an infinite set of
symbols, called constants, such that LC=<. We put L(C )=L _ C.
Definition 4.1. Let L be a language. A theory T=(1, 7) is saturated if:
1. T=(1, 7) is consistent,
2. 1 is prime,
3. for every formula _x,(x), the condition _x,(x) # 1 implies that there exists
a constant c # L such that ,(c) # 1.
Proposition 4.1. Every consistent theory T=(1, 7) of the language L can be
extended to a saturated theory T=(1 $, 7$) of the language L(C).
Proof. Let :0 , :1 , ... be a list of all sentences of the language L(C ). We construct
a sequence (10 , 70), (11 , 71), ... of theories such that
1. for all i # |, 1i/Ti+1 , 7i/7i+1 ,
2. for all i # |, (1i , 7i) is consistent,
3. i (1i _ 7i)=Sn(L(C )).
We construct this by stages.
Stage 0. Put (10 , 70)=T=(1, 7).
Stage n+1. Suppose that Tn=(1n , 7n) has been constructed. Take :n . We
have two cases.
Case 1. The theory (1n , 7n _ [:n]) is consistent. Then simply put 1n+1=1n
and 7n+1=7n _ [:n].
Case 2. The theory (1n , 7n _ [:n]) is inconsistent and :n is not of the
form _x;(x). Then put 1n+1=1n _ [:n] and 7n+1=7n .
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Case 3. The theory (1n , 7n _ [:n]) is inconsistent and :n is of the form _x;(x).
Then put 1n+1=1n _ [:n , ;(c)] and 7n+1=7n , where c is the first constant in C
not used in the previous stages.
This ends the construction.
Put 1 $=n 1n and 7$=n 7n . Since at each stage :n # 1n+1 _ 7n+1 , we see
that Sn(L(C))=1 $ _ 7$.
Now we need to prove that T $=(1 $, 7$) is consistent. It suffices to show that
for each n the theory Tn=(1n , 7n) is consistent. We show it by induction on n.
The case n=0 is trivial. Suppose that Tn=(1n , 7n) is consistent. If Tn+1=
(1n+1 , 7n+1) is obtained from Tn=(1n , 7n) by either Case 1 or Case 2, then we
simply repeat the corresponding proof from Proposition 3.1. Suppose that Tn+1=
(1n+1 , 7n+1) is obtained from Tn=(1n , 7n) by Case 3. Then Tn+1=(1n+1 , 7n+1)
coincides with (1n _ [:n , ;(c)], 7n). If Tn+1=(1n+1 , 7n+1) were inconsistent,
then for some ;1 , ..., ;m from 7n+1=7n the sentence ;1 6 } } } 6 ;m would belong
to the closure of 1n _ [:n , ;(c)]. Since c does not occur in Tn and (1n , 7n _ [:n]),
one can see that Tn is inconsistent. This contradicts with the inductive assumption.
Now we need to prove the last requirement for saturation. Suppose that _x;(x)
is in 1 $. Let n be such that :n=_x;(x). Note that (1n , 7n _ [:n]) is inconsistent,
otherwise, :n  1 $. Hence by construction, at stage n+1 we have Case 3. It follows
that ;(c) # 1 $ for some c. The proposition is proved.
An immediate corollary of this result is its effective version:
Proposition 4.2. If T=(1, 7) is a computable consistent theory with finite 7,
then there exists a computable saturated extension T $=(1 $, 7$) of T=(1, 7) in the
expansion L(C ).
Proof. The proof follows from the facts that under the assumptions, all the
stages in the construction of (1 $, 7$) from the previous proposition can be carried
out effectively. Moreover, for any :n , we have have :n # 1 $ if and only if :n # 1n .
The proposition is proved.
Corollary 4.1. If T=(1, 7) is computable in X and is a consistent theory with
finite 7, then there exists a computable in X saturated extension T$=(1 $, 7$) of
T=(1, 7) in the expansion L(C ).
5. DECIDABLE ADEQUATE MODELS IN IPL
For this section, S is IPL. We begin by defining the notion of decidable frame.
Definition 5.1. Let X be a set of natural numbers. A frame (W, , D) is
decidable in X if the relation
w # W 7 w1w2 7 x # D(w)
is computable in X. If X is computable, then the frame is called decidable.
Thus if F is a decidable frame, then from the definition it follows that we can
assume that W is a computable subset of |, or in fact that it is |, that the order
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relation is a computable subset of W2, and that the subsets D(w), w # W are uniformly
computable.
The next definition formalizes the notion of a decidable Kripke model. Informally,
a Kripke model over a computable frame is decidable if the forcing in the model
is a computable relation. Here is the definition.
Definition 5.2. A Kripke model (W, , D, V ) over a decidable in X frame
(W, , D) is X-decidable if the set
[(w, :(c1 , ..., cn)) | w # W, :(c1 , ..., cn) # Sn(L(w)), w forces :(c1 , ..., cn)]
is computable in X. If X is computable, then the Kripke model is called decidable.
Now we are ready to prove an effective version of the model existence theorem
of intuitionistic logic. We give a detailed proof of this theorem since we will refine
this proof to obtain our further results.
Theorem 5.1. Any computable theory (1, =) has a decidable model M such that
for all : # Sn(L), : is deducible from 1 if and only if M forces :.
Proof. We set L0=L and Ln+1=L(Cn+1), where C1 , C2 , ... is an effective
sequence of infinite, uniformly computable, and pairwise disjoint sets of constant
symbols.
Lemma 5.1. There exists an executive procedure p which for all x, i # | and all
finite subsets 2, if x is regarded as an index of a computable consistent theory (1, 2)
of the language Li , produces an index p(x, 2) of a computable complete saturated
theory (1, 2) of the language Li , produces an index p(x, 2) of a computable complete
saturated theory (1(x, 2), 7(x, 2)) in the language Li+1 extending (1, 2).
Proof. The proof follows from the construction in the proof of Proposition 3.1.
The proof shows that knowing an index of a consistent theory (1, 2) with finite
given 2, one can effectively build a saturated, complete and computable extentsion
(1 $, 7$) of (1, 2). The theory (1 $, 7$) is a theory of the language Li+1 . Moreover,
the construction provides an algorithm to decide T=(1 $, 7$). Hence the lemma is
proved.
We want to define the base (W, ) of the desired decidable adequate Kripke
model for theory (1, =).
Let :0 ...:n be a sequence of sentences with the following properties:
1. Every :i belongs to Sn(Li).
2. Every :i is either of the form ;  # or \y;( y).
We define a procedure described below which depends on :0 } } } :n and consists
of at most n+1 steps.
Step 0. The step is unsuccessful if (1, :0) is inconsistent. If this happens we
terminate the procedure. Otherwise, we consider two cases:
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Case 1. :0 is of the form ;  #. In this case (1 _ [;], [#]) is consistent. We
effectively take an index x of this theory (1 _ [;], [#]). Applying Lemma 5.1, we get the
theory (1 _ [;](x, [#]), 7(x, [#])). We set T(:0) to be (1 _ [;](x, [#]), 7(x, [#])).
Case 2. :0 is of the form \y;( y). In this case there is a constant c # L1 such that
(1, [;(c)]) is consistent. We effectively take an index x of this theory (1, [;(c)]).
Applying Lemma 5.1, we get the theory (1(x, [;(c)]), 7(x, [;(c)])). We set T(:0)=
(1(x, [;(c)]), 7(x, [;(c)])).
Step i+1, in. Suppose that T(:0 , ..., :i) has been constructed. Consider
lT(:1 , ..., :i). The step is unsuccessful if (lT(:1 , ..., :i), [:i+1]) is inconsistent. If this
happens we terminate the procedure. Otherwise, consider two cases:
Case 1. :i+1 is ;  #. In this case the theory (lT(:1 , ..., :i) _ [;], [#]) is consistent.
We effectively take an index x of this theory. Applying Lemma 5.1, we get the theory
(lT(:1 , ..., :i) _ [;](x, [#]), 7(x, [#])). We set
T(:0 , ..., :i+1)=(lT(:1 , ..., :i) _ [;](x, [#], 7(x, [#])).
Case 2. :i+1 is of the form \y;( y). In this case there is a constant c # Li+2 such
that (lT(:1 , ..., :i), [;(c)]) is consistent. We effectively compute an index x of this
theory. Applying Lemma 5.1, we get the theory (lT(:1 , ..., :i)(x, [;(c)]), 7(x, [;(c)])).
We set
T(:1 , ..., :i+1)=(lT(:1 , ..., :i)(x, [;(c)]), 7(x, [;(c)])).
This concludes the description of the procedure.
Definition 5.3. We say that the sequence :0 } } } :n is T-ordered if the theory
T(:0 , ..., :n) is defined.
Let W be the set of all T-ordered sequences. Let w, v be elements of W. We put
wv if and only if w is an initial segment of v, that is v=w:k } } } :m for some
:k , ..., :m # Lm+1 . The relation  is a computable relation, and is in fact a partial
ordering of W. The next lemma follows from the definition of W and .
Lemma 5.2. The partially ordered set (W, ) is computable. Moreover it is
isomorphic to a disjoint union of countably many copies of an infinitely branching
tree.
We define a frame (W, , D) as follows, Let w=:0 } } } :n . Then,
D(w)=the set of all constants of the language Ln+1 .
By Lemma 4.2 and the definition of D, the frame (W, , D) is computable. We
define a valuation V on the frame as follows. Let w=:0 } } } :n # W and P # L be a
predicate symbol. Then
P(c1 , ..., cn) is classically) true iff P(c1 , ..., cn) belongs to lT(:0 , ..., :n).
Thus, we have a Kripke model (W, D, V ). We need the following
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Lemma 5.3. Let w=:o } } } :n be a ‘‘state of knowledge’’ from the Kripke model M
defined above. Let , and ,$ be sentences of the language L(w). Then:
1. ,  ,$ # lT(w) if, and jonly if, for all vw, the condition , # lT(v) implies
,$ # lT(v).
2. c, # lT(w) if, and only if, for all vw we have ,  lT(v).
3. ,=\x,$ # lT(w) if, and only if, for all vw and c # V(v) we have
,$(c) # lT(v).
4. , 7 ,$ # lT(w) if, and only if, , and ,$ belong to lT(w).
5. , 6 ,$ # lT(w) if, and only if, either , or ,$ belong to lT(w).
Proof. Let T(w)=(1(w), 7(w)). We prove the lemma by induction on the
length of sentences ,. If , is atomic, then we have nothing to prove.
We prove part 1. If ,  ,$ # 1(w), , # 1(v) and 1(w)/1(v), then since 1(v)
is closed under deduction we obtain that ,$ # 1(v). Suppose that ,  ,$  1(w).
It follows that ,  ,$ is not intuitionistically deducible from 1(w). Hence,
w,  ,$ # W and T(w,  ,$) is a saturated consistent theory such that 1(w,  ,$)
contains , but does not contain ,$. This proves Part 1. Parts 2 and 3 can be proved
in a similar way.
To prove parts 4 and 5 note that if , is ,$ 7 ," or ,$6 ,", then the proofs of
these parts of the lemma follows from the facts that 1(w) is closed under deduction
and is a prime theory.
From this lemma, again using induction on ,, we deduce that in the Kripke
model M=(W, , D, V ), the state of knowledge w forces a sentence , if and only
if , belongs to 1(w). By the lemma above combined with Lemma 4.1, we conclude
that the forcing in M is computable. Hence the model is decidable. Moreover, by
the previous lemma we see that for any , # Sn(L), , is deducible from T if and only
if , is forced in model M. Hence M is adequate. The theorem is proved.
Corollary 5.1. Any consistent theory (1, =) computable in X has an X-decidable
model M such that for all : # Sn(L), : is deducible from 1 if and only if M forces :.
Proof. Relativize the proof of the previous theorem.
Definition 5.4. We say that a theory T=(1, =) is complete for a class K of
Kripke models if for any , not intuitionistically deducible from 1 there is a Kripke
model M from K such that M is a model of 1 but not ,.
The next result directly follows from Theorem 5.1 and the definition above.
Corollary 5.2. Every computable intuitionistic theory T is complete for the
class of decidable Kripke models.
6. DECIDABLE ADEQUATE MODELS IN CPL
In this section we assume that the logic S is the classical predicate logic CPL.
Classically, we know that if T=(1, 7) is a theory, then there is a sequence
M0 , M1 , ... of classical models such that the set of all sentences classically true in all
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models from the sequence is exactly the set of all sentences deducible from 1.
We can transform the above sequence of models into a Kripke model (W, , D, V )
as follows. We set W=|, =[(i, i) | i # |], D(i)=Mi , V(i)=Mi , where Mi is the
domain of the model Mi . In other words, frames (W, , D) such that vw implies
v=w characterize first order logic. We call such frames antichains. The main result
of this section is the following theorem.
Theorem 6.1. Let T=(1, =) be a computable theory over CPL. Then T has a
decidable adequate Kripke model over a computable antichain.
Proof. Our proof follows the lines of a proof of [2], used there for a different
purpose. First, we expand the original language L to L(C), where C is a computable
infinite set of new constants. Let :0 , :1 , ... be an effective sequence of all sentences
of the language L not deducible from T. Let ;0 , ;1 , ... be an effective sequence of
all sentences in the expanded language. We present an effective procedure which,
uniformly in i, i # |, constructs a computable maximal consistent set 1i of the
language L(C ) such that c:i # Ti . We proceed in stages.
Stage 0. Put 1i, 0=1 _ [c:i].
Stage n+1. Suppose that 1i, n has been constucted. Consider ;n . If 1i, n _ [;n]
is inconsistent, then set 1i, n+1=1i, n . Otherwise, we have two cases. If ;n is not
of the form _x#(x), then 1i, n+1=1i, n _ [:n]. If ;n is of the form _x#(x), then
1i, n+1=1i, n _ [:n , #(c)], where c is the first new constant not appeared in 1i, n .
Put 1i=n 1i, n . The following facts can be proved from the construction using
induction.
1. Every 1i is a consistent theory.
2. Every 1i is a maximal consistent set.
Indeed, the first fact can be proved using induction on n. The second fact follows
easily from the fact that a ;n belongs to 1i if and only if ;n belongs to 1i, n+1 . The
construction also shows that the set
[(i, ,(c1 , ..., cn)) | ,(c1 , ..., cn) # L(C ), ,(c1 , ..., cn) # 1i]
is a computable set. Now define the antichain (W, ) as follows: W=|,
=[(i, i) | i # |]. Let D(i) be the set of all constants of the expanded language.
For each i define a valuation V(i) as follows. Value P(c1 , ..., cn) is true if and only
if P(c1 , ..., cn) # 1i . By induction on the complexity of sentences ,(c1 , ..., cn), we can
show that ,(c1 , ..., cn) is classically true in V(i) if and only if ,(c1 , ..., cn) # 1i . Since
(W, ) is an antichain, the forcing on every w # W coincides with classical truth on
V(w) [16]. Hence forcing is computable in the Kripke model (W, , D, V ). It
follows that (W, , D, V ) is a decidable Kripke model.
By the construction of 1i , we also see that for every , # Sn(L), , belongs to T
if and only if , belongs to i 1i . Hence (W, , D, V ) is an adequate model of T.
The theorem is proved.
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7. DECIDABLE ADEQUATE MODELS IN CDL
A Kripke frame (W, , D) is a constant domain frame if for all v, w # W, we have
D(v)=D(w). Thus, a frame (W, , D) is computable constant domain frame if it
is a computable and constant domain frame. Let us recall that the constant domain
logic denoted by CDL extends IPL by adding the axiom schema
\x(,(x) 6 )  \x,(x) 6 ,
where x is not free in . One of the well-known results in model theory of intui-
tionistic logic states that CDL is complete for the class of constant domain Kripke
frames [3, 17]. The goal of this section is to show that this result can be effectivized.
Indeed, we prove that any computable theory over CDL is complete for the class of
decidable constant domain frames. Thus, the main result of this section is the following
theorem.
Theorem 7.1. Let T=(1, =) be a computable theory over CDL. Then the theory
T possesses an adequate, decidable, constant domain Kripke model.
Proof. Our proof is an effectivization of completeness proofs of CDL from
[3, 17]. The proof also incorporates the ideas of the proof of Theorem 5.1. We will
need several definitions and lemmas. We begin our proof by giving the following
definition.
Definition 7.1. A theory (1, 7) is Henkin complete if it is complete and the
following conditions hold:
1. For all :(x), if :(c) # 1 for every constant c # L, then \x:(x) # 1.
2. For every formula _x:(x), if _x:(x) # 1, then :(c) # 1 for some c # L.
It is clear that every Henkin complete theory is saturated as well. We now prove
the following proposition whose proof is similar to the proofs of Propositions 3.1
and 4.1 but is more delicate.
Proposition 7.1. Every consistent theory (1, 7 ) over language L can be extended
to a Henkin complete theory over the expanded language L(C ).
Proof of the Proposition. We first expand the language L to L(C ). Now consider
the following three sequences of sentences. The first sequence,
\x:0(x), \x:1(x), \x:2(x), ...,
contains all universal sentences in L(C ). The second sequence,
_x;0(x), _x;1(x), _x;2(x)...,
contains all existential sentences in L(C ). The third sequence,
#0 , #1 , #2 ...,
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contains all sentences in L(C). We construct a sequence (10 , 70), (11 , 71), ... of
theories such that each (1i , 7i) extends (1i&1 , 7i&1). The construction will guarantee
that the union (i 1i , i 7i) is the desired extension.
Stage &1. We put (1&1 , 7&1)=(1, 7).
Stage n+1. We assume that (1n , 7n) has been constructed and is consistent.
Suppose that n+1=3k. We have two cases.
Case 1a. The theory (1n , 7n _ [\x:k(x)]) is consistent. Then put 1n+1=1n
and 7n+1=7n _ [\x:k(x), :(c)], where c is the first constant not used in the
previous stages.
Case 2a. The theory (1n , 7n _ [\x:k(x)]) is inconsistent. Then set 1n+1=
1n _ [\x:k(x)] and 7n+1=7n .
Suppose that n+1=3k+1. We have two cases.
Case 1b. The theory (1n , 7n _ [_x;k(x)]) is consistent. Then put 1n+1=1n
and 7n+1=7n _ [_x;k(x)].
Case 2b. The theory (1n , 7n _ [_x;k(x)]) is inconsistent. Then set 7n+1=7n
and 1n+1=1n _ [_x;k(x), ;k(c)], where c is the first constant not used in the
previous stages.
Suppose that n+1=3k+2.
Case 1c. The theory (1n , 7n _ [#k]) is consistent. Then put 1n+1=1n and
7n+1=7n _ [#k].
Case 2c. The theory (1n , 7n _ [#k]) is inconsistent. Then set 7n+1=7n and
1n+1=1n _ [#k].
This ends the construction at stage n+1.
Now put 7$=i 7i and 1 $=i 1i . Using similar ideas as in the proofs of
Propositions 2.1 or 3.1, one can see that (1 $, 7$) is a consistent and complete
theory. We need to prove that (1 $, 7$) is Henkin complete. Indeed, suppose that
_x,(x) # 1 $. Let n be such that _x;n(x)=_x,(x). It follows that at stage 3n+1, we
have Case 2b. Hence ,(c) # 1 $. Suppose that :(c) # 1 $ for all c but \x:(x)  1 $. Let
\x:n(x) be equal to \x:(x). It follows that at stage 3n, we have Case 1a. Then
:n(c) # 7n+1 for some constant c. It follows that :(c) # 7$. Contradiction. Thus, we
have proved the proposition.
An immedate corollary of this proposition is the following result.
Corollary 7.1. If (1, 7) is a consistent and computable theory theory with
finite 7, then one can effectively extend the theory to a Henkin complete computable
theory (1 $,7$), computing an index of a computable characteristic function for (1 $, 7$).
We give the following important definition.
Definition 7.2. Let 1 be a consistent set of sentences of a language L.
1. 1 is strongly universal if for all \x;(x) and finite 2/Sn(L), the condition
(1, [\x;(x)] _ 2) is consistent implies that (1, [;(c)] _ 2) is consistent for some
c in L.
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2. 1 strongly existential if for all _x;(x) and finite 2/Sn(L), the condition
(1 _ [_x;(x)], 2) is consistent implies that (1 _ [;(c)], 2) is consistent for some
c in L.
The following follows from Proposition 7.1.
Corollary 7.2. For every Henkin complete theory (1 $, 7$) the set 1 $ is strongly
universal and strongly existential. Hence every consistent theory (1, 7) can be extended
to a theory (1 $, 7$) such that 1 $ is strongly universal and strongly existential.
Proof. The proof follows from Proposition 7.1 and the above definition.
Now we prove one of the basic lemmas. We borrow the proof from [3, 17].
Lemma 7.1. Suppose that T=(1, 7) is a theory in a language L with strongly
universal and strongly existential 1. Let S be a logic containing CDL. Then for every
sentence : # Sn(L), the extension 1 _ [:] is also strongly universal and strongly
existentional.
Proof. We first prove that 1 _ [:] is strongly universal. Take any finite set
2/Sn(L) and a formula \x;(x). Suppose that (1 _ [:], 2 _ [\x;(x)]) is consistent.
Suppose that for every constant c # L, (1 _ [:], 2 _ [;(c)]) is inconsistent. Hence,




#i 7 :   2 6 ;(c),
where 2 is the disjunction of all sentences from 2. It follows that
1 |&S :   2 6 ;(c)
for all c. Hence (1, [:  2 6 ;(c)]) is inconsistent for all c. It follows that
(1, [\x(:  2 6 ;(x))]) is inconsistent. Indeed, otherwise since 1 is strongly
universal there would exist a constant c such that (1, [:  2 6 ;(c)]) is consistent.
This would be a contradiction. Now using the fact that S contains CDL, we
get that (1, [:  2 6 \x;(x)]) is inconsistent. But this can not happen since
(1 _ [:], [\;(x)] _ 2) is consistent, a contradication. Thus, the first part of the
lemma is proved.
Now we prove the second part of the lemma. We need to show that 1 _ [:] is
strongly existential. Suppose that (1 _ [_x;(x)] _ [:], 2) is consistent. Suppose
that (1, [;(c)  2]) is inconsistent for every constant c. Then by the first part
(1 _ [:], [\x(;(x)  2)]) is inconsistent. Hence (1 _ [:], [_x;(x)  2]) is
inconsistent by intuitionistic logic. Hence we have a contradiction with the original
assumption that (1 _ [:], [_x;(x)  2]) is consistent. The lemma is proved.
Now we can repeat the proof of Theorem 5.1. We set L0=L and L1=L(C1), and
Ln+1=Ln , where C1 is an infinite and computable set of constant symbols. We can
define the base W in the same way that we did in the proof of Theorem 5.1. The
point is that the lemmas above allow us to proceed constructing Henkin complete
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theories corresponding to the nodes w of W without expanding the language L1 .
Therefore for all w # W, the set D(w) is the set of all constants of the language L1 .
Hence there exists a decidable, adequate, constant domain Kripke model for (1, =).
This proves the theorem.
Definition 7.3. An adequate Kripke model of a theory (1, 7) is a Henkin model
if for every w and every sentence \x:(x) # L(w) the condition w does not force \x:(x)
implies that there is a c # D(w) such that w does not force :(c).
Corollary 7.3. Every theory possesses a Henkin model. Moreover every
computable theory possesses a decidable Henkin model.
Proof. The proof follows from the Proposition 7.1 and Theorem 5.1.
8. COMPUTABILITY OF ADEQUATE MODELS IN QJ
Let S be a logic complete for a class K of frames. The results of the previous
sections suggest the following natural question:
If T is a computable theory, then what can be said about computability of adequate
models of T over frames from K?
From the previous sections we see that in the case when S is either IPL, CPL,
or CDL), then computability of T implies that T possesses decidable adequate
Kripke models over the class of tree frames, antichain frames, or constant domain
frames, respectively. But it is not possible in general to contsruct decidable Kripke
models for computable theories if we consider Kripke models over a fixed class of
frames K, even when S is complete for K. In this and the next section we show that
proofs of completeness results for logic QJ as well as KJ do not necessarily produce
decidable adequate Kripke models for computable theories.
We fix the logic QJ and begin with the investigation of computability of adequate
models for computable theories over logic QJ. We follow ideas of the completeness
proof of QJ from [5]. The completness result for QJ states that QJ is complete for the
class of directed Kripke frames. The goal of the section is to prove the following
theorem. Our proof is an effectivization of the proof from [5].
Theorem 8.1. Let T=(1, =) be a computable saturated theory over logic QJ.
Then T possesses an adequate Kripke model which is decidable in 0| and whose base
is a directed frame.
In proving this theorem we provide several definitions and lemmas which can
be of independent interest. We begin with considering the partially ordered set
(N*, ), where N* is the set of all finite words over natural numbers, and  is
defined as follows. For v, w # N*vw iff w is an extension of v, that is, there exists
a z # N* such that v=wz. * denotes the empty word. Hence * is the least element
of (N*, ). This partially ordered set is in fact isomorphic to an infinitely branching
tree. We fix a computable theory T=(1, =) with only one assumption, that 1 is
222 ISHIHARA, KHOUSSAINOV, AND NERODE
File: DISTL2 270419 . By:AK . Date:28:05:98 . Time:14:43 LOP8M. V8.B. Page 01:01
Codes: 3575 Signs: 2521 . Length: 52 pic 10 pts, 222 mm
saturated. Now we give a definition which carries all the information needed to
construct an adequate model of T.
Definition 8.1. A subordination model for 1 is a triple (N*, , 1 ) which
satisfies the following properties.
1. 1 is a mapping which assigns to every w # N* a saturated theory 1 (w) of
the language L(w)=L+C(w), where C(w) is an inifnite set of constants.
2. For all vw, L(v)/L(w) and 1 (w)/1 (w).
3. If w1=wnv1 , w2=wkv2 , and n{k, then (C(w1)"C(w)) & (C(w2)"C(w))=<.
4. If :  ;  1 (w), then there exists an n such that : # 1 (wn) and ;  1 (wn).
5. If \x:(x)  1 (w), then there exists an n such that :(c)  1 (wn) for some
c # C(wn).
6. 1 (*)=1.
Here is the lemma which shows that a subordination model for 1 carries all the
information needed to construct an adequate model of T.
Lemma 8.1. Let T=(1, =) be a saturated theory. Every subordination model
(N*, , 1 ) for 1 can be transformed into an adequate Kripke model M for T.
Moreover the base of M is (N*, ).
Proof. We define the domain function D and the valuation V in the following
natural way. For every w, we set D(w) to be the set of all constants of the language L(w).
For every w and predicate P, we set P(c1 , ..., cn) to be true iff P(c1 , ..., cn) # 1 (w). Now
one can check (see for example Lemma 5.3) that the Kripke model constructed is
the desired one. The lemma is proved.
Definition 8.2. We say that a subordination model (N*, , 1 ) for 1 is
X-decidable if the set [(,, w) | , # Sn(Lw) 7 , # 1 (w)] is computable in X. If X is a
computable set, then the X-decidable subordination model is called decidable.
Lemma 8.2. 1. For every saturated theory T=(1, =) computable in X, there
exists an X-decidable subordination model for 1.
2. Every X-decidable subordination model (N*, , 1 ) for 1 can be transformed
into an X-decidable adequate Kripke model M for T. Moreover the base of M is (N*, ).
Proof. Slightly modifying the proof of Theorem 5.1, one can see that every
computable in X theory T=(1, =) possesses an X-decidable subordination model
for 1.2 The proof of the second part follows from the fact that if subordination
model (N*, , 1 ) is X-decidable, then the adequate Kripke model constructed in
the previous lemma is X-decidable as well.
The next lemma, first proved in [5], uses the schema of the logic QJ and the
definition of subordination model in an essential way.
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Lemma 8.3. Let T=(1, =) be a saturated theory and let (N*, , 1 ) be a sub-
ordination model for 1. Then the set 1()=w # N* 1 (w) is =-consistent.
Proof. It suffices to prove that for every m # |, the set 1m= |w|=m 1 w is
=-consistent, where |w| is the length of w. Suppose that there exists an m such that
1m is not =-consistent. We prove that in this case 1m&1 is also not =-consistent.
In this way by induction, one can show that 1 is not =-consistent.
Since 1m is not =-consistent there exist finite words w1k1 , ..., wnkn of length m
such that 1 (w1 k1) _ } } } _ 1 (wnkn) is not =-consistent. Hence, there exist sentences
;1(a 1 , b 1) # 1 (w1 k1), ..., ;n(a n , b n) # 1 (wnkn) such that
|&QJ ;1(a 1 , b 1) 7 } } } 7 ;n(a n , b n)  =,
where bi # C(wi), ai # C(wik i)"C(wi) for all i, 1in. By the definition of sub-
ordination model we have (C(wiki)"C(wi)) & (C(wjkj)"C(wj))=<. Therefore,
from intuitionistic logic we obtain
|&QJ _x 1;1(x 1 , b 1) 7 } } } 7 _x n;n(x n , b n)  =.
Again from intuitionistic logic it also follows that
|&QJ cc_x 1;1(x 1 , b 1) 7 } } } 7 cc_x n;n(x n , b n)  =.
Note that _x i ;i (x i , b i) # Sn(L(wi)). From the the fact that the logic is QJ, we see
that
1 (wi) |&QJ cc_x i;i (x i , b i) 6 c_x i;i (x i , b i).
Since 1 (wi) is prime we get that cc_x i;i (x i , b i) # 1 (wi) or c_x i; i (x i , b i) # 1 (wi).
It follows that cc_x i ;i (x i , b i) # 1 (wi). Consequently  |w|=m&1 1 (w) is not
=-consistent. Continuing this reasoning, we obtain that 1 is not =-conistent. This
is a contradiction. This proves the lemma.
Now we introduce another partially ordered set and define the notion of n-subordina-
tion model, where n # |. We consider the partially ordered set ([0, 1, ..., n]_N*, ),
where  is defined as follows: (k, w)(m, v) if and only if either k<mn or if k=m,
then v extends w. Informally, this partially ordered set can be thought of as a disjoint
union of infinitely branching tees A0 , A1 , A2 , ..., An such that every element in tree
Ai is greater than all elements in Ai&1 .
Definition 8.3. Let T=(1, =) be a theory. An n-subordination model for 1 is
a triple ([0, ..., n]_N*, , 1 ) which satisfies the following properties.
1. 1 is a mapping which assigns to every w # [0, 1, ..., n]_N* a saturated
theory 1 w of the language L(w)=L+C(w).
2. For every kn, the triple ([k]_N*, n, 1 n) is a subordination model for
1 ((k, *)), where k, 1 k are restrictions of , 1 to [k]_N*.
3. For all kn, w<(k, *) 1 (w)/1 ((k, *)) and w<(k, *) C(w)/C((k, *)).
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4. For all kn, (1 ((k, *)), =) is a saturated theory.
5. 1 ((0, *))=1.
A standard technique developed in the previous lemmas shows that the following
lemma is true.
Lemma 8.4. Let T=(1, =) be a theory. Every n-subordination model
([0, 1, ..., n]_N*, , 1 ) for 1 can be transformed into an adequate Kripke model
M for T. Moreover the base of M is ([0, 1, ..., n]_N*, ).
Theorem 8.2. For every computable saturated theory T=(1, =), there exists an
adequate Kripke model M with the following properties:
1. The base of M is ([0, 1, ..., n]_N*, ).
2. The model M is decidable in 0n.
Proof. From Lemma 8.2, we see that every computable theory T=(1, =)
possesses a decidable subordination model (N*, , 1 ) for 1. Consider the theory
T=(w # N* 1 (w), =). This theory is computably enumerable. It follows that the
deductive closure of w # N* 1 (w) is computable in 0$. We can extend this theory to
a saturated theory T $=(1 $, =) over an expanded language such that T $ is
computable in 0$. Now we can develop a subordination model (N*, , 1 $) for 1 $
in a such way that the set [(w, ,) | , # Lw 7 , # 1 $(w)] is computable in 0$. This
shows that we can construct a 1-subordination model for 1 for which the set
[(w, ,) | , # L(w) 7 , # 1 $(w)] is computable in 0$. Hence by the previous lemma
we can transform this 1-subordination model into an adequate model of T which
is decidable in 0$. Iterating this procedure n&1 times and using Lemma 8.2, we see
that 1 has an n-subordination model [0, 1, ..., n]_N*, , 1 (n) for which the set
[(w, ,) | , # L(w) 7 , # 1 (n)(w)] is computable in 0n. This proves Theorem 8.2.
Definition 8.4. Let T=(1, =) be a saturated theory. An |-subordination model
for 1 is a triple (|_N*, , 1 ) such that
1. 1 is a mapping which assigns to every w # |_N* a saturated theory 1 w
of the language L(w)=L+C(w),
2. for every n # |, the triple ([n]_N*, n, 1 n) is a subordination model for
1 ((n, *)), where  n, 1 n are restrictions of , 1 to [n]_N*,
3. for all n # |, w<(n, *) 1 (w)/1 ((n, *)) and w<(n, *) C(w)/C((n, *)),
4. for all n # |, (1 ((n, *)), =) is a saturated theory,
5. 1 ((0, *))=1.
The following lemma is immediate:
Lemma 8.5. Let T=(1, =) be a saturated theory. Every |-subordination model
(|_N*, , 1 ) for 1 can be transformed into an adequate Kripke model M for T.
Moreover the base of M is (|_N*, ).
Note that (|_N*, ) is a directed partially ordered set. Now we are ready to
prove the main theorem of this section.
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Proof of Theorem 8.1. Iterating the proof of Theorem 8.2 countably many times
define a triple (|_N*, , 1 ) such that
1. ([0]_N*, 0, 1 0) is a decidable subordination model for 1, where
0, 1 0 are restrictions of  and 1 to [0]_N*,
2. 1 (n, *) is a saturated extension of w<(n, *) 1 (w),
3. For every n # |, ([0, 1, ..., n]_N*, n, 1 n) is a n-subordination model for
1 computable in 0n, where n, 1 n are restrictions of  and 1 to [0, 1, ..., n]_N*,
4. the set [(,, w) | w # |_N*, , # L(w), , # 1 (w)] is computable in 0|.
By Lemma 8.2 and 8.3 above we see that the triple (|_N*, , 1 ) is an |-subor-
dination model for T. Hence this subordination model defines an adequate Kripke
model M for T by Lemma 8.5. By the last item of the properties 1 we see that M
is decidable in 0|. This proves Theorem 8.1.
9. ALMOST DECIDABLE ADEQUATE MODELS
In this section we investigate computability of adequate models in logic KJ. All
the deductions are in KJ. We also assume that the given theory T=(1, =) is
saturated. The completness result for this logic states that KJ is complete for the
class of frames with maximum elements. Our basic definition is the following.
Definition 9.1. Kripke model (W, , D, V ) is almost decidable if there is a
finite subset F of W such that
1. The Kripke model (W"F, , D, V ) is decidable,
2. The Kripke model (W"F, , D, V ) and the Kripke model (W, , D, V )
force the same sentences.
The goal of this section is to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 9.1. Let T=(1, =) be a computable saturated theory. Then T possesses
an adequate model M with the following properties:
1. The frame of M is a frame with maximum element.
2. M is decidable in 0$.
3. M is almost decidable.
Our proof is an effectivization of the completeness proof from [5]. In our proof
we use the following result, known as Glivenko’s theorem. For the proof of this
theorem, see for example [3].
Theorem (Glivenko). For any sentence :, cc : is provable in KJ if and only
if : is provable in CPL.
The proof of Theorem 9.1 is based on the technique developed in the previous
section. Indeed, we use a modification of the notion of subordination model. We
extend the partially ordered set (N*, ) to the partially ordered set (N* _ [], ),
where for all w # N* we declare w<.
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Definition 9.2. A subordination model with maximum element for 1 is a triple
(N* _ [], , 1 ) which satisfies:
1. (N*, , 1 ) is a subordination model form 1,
2. for all w # N*, 1 (w)/1 ().
3. (1 (), =) is Henkin complete,
4. if :  ;  1 (), then : # 1 () and ;  1 ().
The following lemma is immediate:
Lemma 9.1. Let T=(1, =) be a saturated theory. Every subordination model
with maximum element (N* _ [], , 1 ) for 1 can be transformed into an
adequate Kripke model M for T, Moreover the base of M is (N* _ [], ).
We need another lemma about extensions of consistent theories. Say that
(1, [,]) is ,-maximal if for any sentence : of the language of 1 if (1 _ [:], [,])
is consistent, then : # 1.
Lemma 9.2. Suppose that T=(1, [0]) is a consistent theory in language L. Let
L(C )=L _ C where C is an infinite set of constants such that L & C=<. Then there
is a 0-maximal saturated theory T $=(1 $, [0]) of the language L(C ) extending
(1, [0]).
Proof. Let ,0 , ,1 , ,2 , ... be a computable sequence of all sentences of the
language L in which every sentence appears infinitely many times. We construct 1 $
by stages. At stage t+1 we define 1t+1 such that 1t1t+1 . At the end we put
1 $=t 1t . At each stage t+1 we treat the sentence ,t . If we do not put ,t into
1t+1 , then ,t will not belong to 1 $. Since the procedure is effective, 1 $ will be
computable.
Stage 0. 10=1.
Stage t+1. Suppose that 1t has been constructed. Take ,t . We have three
cases.
Case 1. ,t is A 6 B. If 0 is not deducible from 1t _ [A], then we define
1t+1=1t _ [A]. Suppose that 0 is deducible from 1t _ [A]. Then if 0 is not
deducible from 1t _ [B], we define 1t+1 to be 1t _ [B]. Otherwise, we define
1t+1=1t .
Case 2. ,t is _x,(x). If 0 is not deducible from 1t _ [,t], then we define 1t+1
to be 1t _ [,t , ,(c)], where c is the first constant not belonging to 1t . Otherwise,
we define 1t+1=1t .
Case 3. Suppose that neither of the previous cases holds. If 0 is not deducible
from 1t _ [,t], then we set 1t+1=1t _ [,t]. Otherwise, we define 1t+1=1t .
This ends the construction.
Define 1 $ to be t 1t . We prove that (1 $, [0]) is a 0-maximal theory.
First, we show that 0 is not intuitionistically deducible from 1. Suppose
otherwise. Then there exists a t such that 0 is deducible from 1t+1 . We prove by
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induction on k that 0 is not deducible from 1k . Clearly, 0 is not deducible from
10 . Suppose that 0 is not deducible from 1t .
Suppose that Case 1 of stage t+1 holds. Then 1t+1 properly extends 1t since by
inductive hypothesis 0 is not deducible from 1t . It follows that ,t=A 6 B and
that either 1t+1 is 1t _ [A] or 1t _ [B]. If 1t+1 is 1t _ [A], then by the definition
of 1t+1 , 0 is not deducible from 1i+1 _ [A]. Similarly, if 1t+1 is 1t _ [B], then
0 is not deducible from 1t+1 . This is a contradiction.
Suppose that Case 2 holds. Then 1t+1 is 1t _ [,t , ,(c)]. Then 0 is deducible
from 1t _ [,t , ,(c)], hence 0 is deducible from 1t _ [,t].
Suppose that Case 3 holds. Then 0 is not deducible from 1t+1 .
It follows that 0 is not deducible from 1 $.
We need to show that 1 $ is closed under deduction. Suppose that , is deducible
from 1 $. There is a t such that ,=,t . It follows that 0 is not deducible from
1t _ [,]. So, by the definition of 1t+1 , , belongs to 1t+1 .
Suppose that , 6  # 1 $. There is a t such that , 6  # 1t+1 . Since every sentence
, appears infinitely many time in the sequence ,0 , ,1 , ..., we see that there is a k>t
such that ,k=, 6 . Hence at stage k+1 either , or  enters 1 $.
Suppose that _x,(x) # 1 $. There is a k such that ,k=_x,(x). At stage k+1, ,(c)
enters 1 $ for some c by the definition of the stage.
Now we prove that if 0 is not a consequence of 1 $ _ [,], then , # 1 $. There is
a t such that ,t=, 6 ,. Then at stage t+1, , enters 1 $. The lemma is proved.
From the proof of this lemma we get the following corollary.
Corollary 9.1. Consider a saturated theory (1, =) computable in X. There is a
maximal saturated extension (1 $, =) of (1, =) which is computable in X.
Lemma 9.3. Suppose that (1, =) is a maximal and saturated theory. Then (1, =)
is Henkin complete. Moreover, if :  ;  1, then : # 1 and ;  1.
Proof. Recall that the logic is KJ. Also note that since (1, =) is maximal, for
every sentence # either # belongs to 1 or c# belongs to 1. We need to prove that
1 is Henkin complete. Suppose that \x:(x)  1 but for all constants of the language
of 1, :(c) # 1. Since \x:(x)  1 it follows that c\x:(x) # 1. We know that c\x:(x) 
_xc:(x) is classically true. Hence, by Glivenko’s theorem we have that c(c\x:(x) 
_xc:(x)) belongs to 1. Therefore (c\x:(x)  _xc:(x)) belongs to 1. It follows that
_xc:(x) # 1. Since (1, =) is saturated, we see that c:(c) # 1. This is a contradiction.
Now we prove the second part of the lemma. Suppose that :  ;  1. Then
c(:  ;) # 1. By intuitionistic logic cc: 7 c; # 1. It follows that cc: # 1 and
c; # 1. Hence : # 1,but ;  1. The lemma is proved.
Proof of the Theorem 9.1. Consider a computable saturated theory T=(1, =).
Develop a decidable subordination model (N*, 1 ). This defines a decidable
Kripke model M1 with base (N*, ). By Lemma 8.3, the theory w # N* 1 (w)
is consistent. Note that w # N* 1 (w) is computably enumerable. Hence its
deductive closure is computable in 0$. By Lemma 9.2 we can extend the theory
(w # N* 1 (w), =) to a maximal theory (1 (), =). Thus, we have a subordination
model with maximum element N* _ [], , 1 ) for 1. By Lemma 9.1 we can
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transform this subordination model to a Kripke model M2 for T. Note that by
Corollary 9.1 this model is decidable in 0$. The base of this model is the frame
(N* _ [], ). Clearly M2 is almost decidable since M1 is decidable. This proves
the theorem.
10. CONCLUSION
The reader can see that results similar to those of the previous sections can be
obtained for many other intermediate logics. We state without proofs two other
results for two intermediate logics which are known to be complete.
The first logic is Dummett ’s logic, denoted by DL. This logic is obtained by
adding the schema
(:  ;) 6 (;  :)
to IPL. The second logic, denoted by KJC, is obtained by adding the schema
\xcc:(x)  cc\x:(x)
to QJ+CD.
Dummett’s logic DL is complete for the class of frames (W, , D) such that for
u, w # W either uw or ww. These frames are called linear frames. The proof of
this result is in [6]. A careful checking of this proof shows that the following
theorem is true.
Theorem 10.1. Every computable theory over logic DL possesses a decidable
Kripke model whose frame is a linear frame.
The logic KJC is complete for the class of frames with maximum elements and
with constant domain. A proof of this fact is in [5]. One can check that the proof
of this completeness result leads to the following.
Theorem 10.2. Every computable theory over logic KJC possesses an almost
decidable Kripke model whose base is a frame with a maximum element and constant
domains. Moreover the model is decidable in 0$.
Further investigation of computable model theory of intuitionistic logic looks to
be fruitful and interesting. We believe that this kind of computability theory brings
new ideas and insight into the understanding of Kripke models of intuitionistic
theories.
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